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CHAPTER 17 
Insurance 
J. MARSHALL LEYDON 
A. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
§17.1. Repeal of insurance premium surcharges. The unique 
Massachusetts attempt to base part of the premium charge of individ-
uals' compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance upon the operating 
records of car drivers came to an end early in the 1956 legislative 
session. The Highway Safety Act,l passed in 1953, had provided for 
the assessment of points against the operating records of Massachusetts 
drivers, the number of points in a particular case to be dependent upon 
the seriousness of the offense. Starting with the automobile registra-
tion year 1956, these points were to be reflected by premium sur-
charges on compulsory motor vehicle liability policies. The antici-
pated result would have been to decrease premium rates for operators 
with good records to something less than they would have been without 
the point system. Correspondingly, the careless driver would have 
been charged a premium (with surcharges) more in keeping with 
the poor experience indicated by his operating record. 
However, operation of the provisions of the Highway Safety Act 
brought opposition on two fronts. Two separate court actions,2 in-
tended to test the constitutionality of the measure, were begun. At 
the same time, various bills calling for repeal of the premium sur-
charges came before the legislature. Repeal of the provisions of the 
Highway Safety Act dealing with premium surcharges was effected 
early in the legislative session, although the point system itself was con-
tinued in existence.3 The prompt action of the legislature left the 
court actions moot. Possibly, if it had been actually tested on its 
merits, the application of points to insurance premium charges might 
have been disapproved by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
After repeal, primary interest centered on the question of the dis-
position of the surcharges already collected by insurance companies 
J. MARSHALL LEYDON is Home Office Counsel for the Employers' Group Insurance 
Companies, Boston. 
The author wishes to express appreciation to Marie L. Clogher, member of the 
Board of Student Editors, for general research assistance. 
§17.l. 1 G.L., c. 90A, added by Acts of 1953, c. 570, §1, as amended. 
2 Winch v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 735, 135 N.E.2d 17; 
Gilmore v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 739, 135 N.E.2d 19. 
8 Acts of 1956, c. 51. 
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issuing compulsory motor vehicle liability policies, surcharges, which, 
in turn, had been used to reduce the premium charges of all insureds 
not subjected to surcharges. The act repealing the assessment of 
premium surcharges was effective early in February, but the policy 
year ran concurrently with the calendar year. An opinion was re-
quested of the Justices on a legislative proposal to require refund of 
the surcharges by the companies to their insureds. The Justices ad-
vised4 that it would not be constitutional for the General Court to 
enact such a law, as it would be creating new substantive rights retro-
spectively based wholly on past events. 
§17.2. Compulsory automobile liability insurance. Until 1956, 
Massachusetts was the only state to have a compulsory system, calling 
for evidence of automobile liability insurance before issuance of regis-
tration plates. Although not technically a part of the Commonwealth's 
legal history for 1956, it seems important to call attention to the enact-
ment in New York of a compulsory system somewhat similar to that 
existing in Massachusetts.1 The New York law calls for higher limits 
of liability, including property damage coverage,2 and purports to im-
pose the New York requirements on nonresident owners and operators 
while in New York. The law retains the ordinary rating system and 
does not, as in the case of Massachusetts, put the authority to set rates 
for compulsory coverage in the Insurance Commissioner. 
In the coming year, other states will probably be considering the 
possibility of adopting a compulsory system. The Massachusetts ex-
perience has always been a major factor in the consideration of such 
legislation. For the first time we in turn will have the experience of 
another state to study, in determining whether modification of the 
Massachusetts law is in order. 
Interest has already been shown in the application to nonresidents 
of the Massachusetts compulsory law.3 Further, a broad study of the 
motor vehicle laws, and of the insurance laws as they relate to motor 
vehicles, has been authorized.4 The wide range of the study and its 
relatively long duration may result in proposals for a comprehensive 
overhauling of the present system. 
Minor changes were actually effected in the existing compulsory law 
in 1956. Reports of motor vehicle accidents had been required to 
be made to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles in cases involving over 
$100 property damage.1i This limit has now been raised to $200.6 
Another revision now makes it mandatory for an insurer, when 
issuing legal notice of cancellation of compulsory motor vehicle 
4 Opinion of the Justices, 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 671, 134 N.E.2d 923. 
§17.2. 1 N.Y. Laws 1956, c. 655. For an excellent discussion of the new statute 
and its background, see Note, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 147 (1957). 
2 From $lO,OOO to $20,000 for bodily injury, and $5000 property damage. 
3 Resolves of 1956, c. 53. 
4 Id., c. 125. 
II G.L., c. 90, §26. 
8 Acts of 1956, c. 225. 
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liability policies, to state the specific reason or reasons for such can-
cellation.7 Under prior statutes no reasons were required to be given 
in the original notice of cancellation, although the insured did have 
the right to obtain the particular reasons upon proper request made to 
the insurer. 
B. LIFE INSURANCE 
§17.3. Group insurance for local government employees. A 1955 
enabling statute provided for establishment of contributory group 
life, accident, hospitalization, surgical, and medical insurance plans for 
employees of local government units.1 Two bills were passed and 
approved during the 1956 session amending this statute,2 but the con-
tents of both were, apparently, included within another act passed 
later in the session completely revising G.L., c. 32B.3 Many changes 
were effected by the latter act, the principal ones being the bringing 
of employees of housing authorities within the scope of such plans, 
a change in the method of determining hospital, surgical, and medical 
benefits payable, and provisions for combining two or more govern-
mental units within the same county into one group for purposes of 
administration and coverage. 
§17.4. Group insurance for state government employees. Group 
coverage for state employees somewhat similar to that provided for 
local government employees by G.L., c. 32B had also been authorized 
in 1955.1 Judges paid by the state (Land Court, Probate, Superior, 
and Supreme Judicial Courts) were specifically excluded from the 
groUp.2 An amendment enacted in 1956 3 now brings these judges 
within the potential group. It also makes clarifying changes as to 
termination of coverage, payment of premiums, and the meaning of a 
"regular work week of permanent employment," one fundamental test 
for inclusion in the group as an employee of the state. 
§17.5. Group life insurance. Group life insurance is defined in 
G.L., c. 185, §133. Under 1956 legislation a new subsection (f) has 
been added to Section 133 permitting members of charitable and re-
ligious associations to insure members under a group plan of life in-
surance, provided the proceeds are payable to the association or are 
to be used for the purpose of carrying out the association's objectives.1 
It is assumed that this legislation will encourage members to enter 
into group plans, probably at somewhat more attractive rates than 
7Id., c. 19l. 
§17.3. 1 G.L., c. 32B, added by Acts of 1955, c. 760, §l. 
2 Acts of 1956, cc. 149, 173. 
8 Id., c. 730. 
§17.4. 1 G.L., c. 32A, added by Acts of 1955, c. 628, §l. 
2 G.L., c. 32A, §l. 
8 Acts of 1956, c. 582. 
§17.5. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 53!!. 
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is possible on an individual basis, which will ultimately benefit the 
particular organization. 
C. POLICY CONSTRUCTION 
§17.6. Life insurance: Condition precedent. It is provided in G.L., 
c. 175, §186 that "No oral or written misrepresentation or warranty 
made in the negotiation of a policy of insurance by the insured or in 
his behalf shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy or 
prevent its attaching unless such misrepresentation or warranty is 
made with actual intent to deceive, or unless the matter misrepresented 
or made a warranty increased the loss." 
The possible application of this section to a clause in an applica-
tion for a life policy was involved in Krause v. Equitable Life Insur-
ance Co. of Iowa.1 In the application the prospective insured stated: 
"I agree that ... the Company shall incur no liability until said 
policy is delivered to me and the entire first premium therefor is ac-
tually paid while I am in good health, and then only if I have not 
consulted or been treated by any physician or practitioner since com-
pletion of the medical examination." Four days after the medical 
examination but prior to the issuance of the policy and payment of 
the first premium, the prospective insured suffered an attack diagnosed 
as angina pectoris. He was treated by a physician. A short time later 
the premium was paid and the policy issued, without knowledge on 
the part of the insurer of these facts. The insured returned to work 
the day following his attack and continued at his occupation until his 
death some eight months later. 
The beneficiary, in an action of contract, asserted that the statement 
in the application constituted a warranty or representation within the 
meaning of C.L., c. 175, §186. If so, the beneficiary would have been 
entitled to a jury determination on the existence of an intent to de-
ceive or increase of loss. 
However, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the clause in ques-
tion went further and, in effect, constituted an agreement between the 
company and the insured that certain conditions must be met before 
coverage under the policy would attach. Construing the clause as a 
condition precedent, the Court held that no contractual duty on the 
part of the insurer arose, as the conditions had not been satisfied. 
§17.7. Life insurance: Injury through "accidental means." A 
recurring problem, in other jurisdictions as well as in Massachusetts, 
has been the difference in coverage granted under insurance policies 
written to require that the insured event be caused by an accidental 
means as opposed to those written to require only that the insured 
event be an accidental result. As pointed out in the 1954 ANNUAL 
SURVEY,1 there is a large number of cases dealing with this problem, 
§17.6. 1333 Mass. 200, 129 N.E.2d 617 (1955). 
§17.7. 11954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.8. 
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which involve accident insurance policies or the double indemnity 
provisions of life insurance policies. A somewhat similar problem can 
arise under liability coverage.2 In Reeves v. John Hancock Mutual 
Life Insurance CO.,3 a double indemnity provision requiring the acci-
dental means test was considered by the Court. 
The insured had suffered pain while lifting mortar tubs. A sub-
sequent operation disclosed a femoral hernia. Death followed shortly 
thereafter, the direct cause being attributed to bronchopneumonia, the 
antecedent cause being an intestinal obstruction due to strangulated 
femoral hernia. An action was begun by the beneficiary to recover 
the "additional" death benefits provided under the policies in the 
event the insured sustained bodily injury "solely through external, 
violent and accidental means." 
The Court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant insurer. The 
only apparent external cause of the injury had been the lifting of the 
tubs. The evidence did not indicate that the lifting had been unin-
tentional or accompanied by any unexpected occurrence. In view of 
the position the Court has taken in the past, that there is a distinc-
tion in coverage between accidental means and accidental result,4 
it was evident to the Court in the Reeves case that, while the death 
may have been accidental, the cause or means was not. 
§17.8. Group life insurance: Exclusion for injuries sustained "in 
the course of employment." A group life insurance policy, issued to 
an employer, came under consideration in Towle v. John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance CO.l The clause in question provided cover-
age against loss of life "as a result of bodily injury sustained solely 
through external, violent and accidental means, directly and inde-
pendently of all other causes, and which do not arise out of and in 
the course of employment for wage or profit." It will be noted that 
the phrase "out of and in the course of employment" follows the lan-
guage universally applied in workmen's compensation law.2 
The employee in the Towle case had died as the result of injuries 
received when he was struck on a private way owned by his employer 
by an automobile driven by a fellow employee. At the time of the 
accident the employee had completed his work for the day and was 
on his way to a shed on the employer'S premises to pick up a Christ-
mas turkey supplied by his employer. The widow, beneficiary under 
the policy, accepted benefits payable under the workmen's compensa-
tion law. In this case, she conceded that the fatal injuries arose out 
of and in the course of the deceased's employment. 
However, in her action to recover under the insurance policy, she 
made the contention that employment for "wage or profit" was not 
2 Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N.E. 182 (1932). 
3333 Mass. 314, 130 N.E.2d 541 (1955). 
4 Lee v. New York Life Insurance Co., 310 Mass. 370, 38 N.E.2d 333 (1941). 
§17.8. 1 333 Mass. 345, 130 N .E.2d 685 (1955). 
2 G.L., c. 152, §26. See 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, cc. 3·5 
(1952). 
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involved at the time of the accident, because the deceased was not then 
actually engaged in work for which he was to be paid. The Court 
rejected this contention, proceeding on the basis that the obvious 
intent was to exclude injuries compensated under the workmen's com-
pensation statutes. The words "wage or profit," said the Court, re-
ferred only to the type of employment involved. The adoption by 
the Court of a construction closely paralleling that given the work-
men's compensation statutes would appear warranted in view of the 
close similari ty of language. 
§17.9. Motor vehicle liability policy: Employee exclusion. In 
Hagerty v. Myers1 the effect of the employee exclusion in a motor 
vehicle liability policy (guest coverage and noncompulsory) was con-
sidered. The exclusion excluded coverage for "bodily injury ... of 
any employee of the insured while engaged in the employment, other 
than domestic, of the insured or in domestic employment if benefits 
therefor are either payable or required to be provided under any work-
men's compensation law." 
The plaintiff secured an execution against his employer for injuries 
received by the negligent operation of an automobile on a private way. 
He brought the present suit to reach and apply the obligation of the 
insurer under its motor vehicle policy. The employer did not, and 
was not required to have, workmen's compensation coverage. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff 
and ordered that a decree be entered dismissing the bill. The court 
below had apparently adopted plaintiff's contention that the only 
employees excluded were those covered, or required to be covered, 
by the workmen's compensation law. As was pointed out by the 
Supreme Judicial Court, such an interpretation gave no weight to the 
phrases in the exclusion which deal with domestic employment. Prop-
erly construed, the exclusion eliminated all employees from coverage, 
except domestic employees, and even domestic employees were also 
excluded if benefits were payable or required to be provided under any 
workmen's compensation law. 
§17.10. Fire insurance: "Direct loss." A declaratory judgment 
action was undertaken in Williams v. Liberty Mutual Insurance CO.1 
to determine the meaning of "direct loss" under the extended cover-
age provisions of a fire insurance policy. The policy in question cov-
ered direct loss by windstorm but excluded loss caused directly or 
indirectly by cold weather. A windstorm tore a shutter off a louver 
in the attic of the insured premises. Following this a spell of cold 
weather set in. Without the protection of the shutter, freezing air 
entered the premises resulting in frozen pipes, followed by bursting 
and water damage. The problem was to determine how much of the 
damage was a direct loss attributable to the windstorm. The Court 
held the only direct loss was the damage to the shutter, the other loss 
§17.9. 1333 Mass. 387, 131 N.E.2d 176 (1955). 
§17.1O. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1017, 135 N.E.2d 910. 
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being of a consequential nature was not covered. The term "direct 
loss" was defined as "the immediate physical damage resulting from 
the effect of the wind." 2 
§17.11. Motor vehicle liability insurance: Contracts with minors. 
An unusual chain of events involving, among other things, disaffirm-
ance of a contract by a minor, characterized Rothberg v. Schmiedes-
kamp.l The minor defendant's motor vehicle liability policy, in addi-
tion to the statutory compulsory coverage, provided guest coverage and 
coverage for the defendant while using another automobile. The pol-
icy further provided that coverage would terminate upon transfer or 
sale of the insured vehicle. 
Subsequent to the issuance of the policy the defendant exchanged his 
car for a different one but sent no notice of the trade to his insurer. 
While driving the newly acquired automobile, he collided with a tree 
or pole causing injury to a guest occupant, the event giving rise to this 
action. The insurer was permitted to intervene2 on a bill for a decla-
ration of its rights and obligations under the contract in a suit brought 
by the injured guest against the defendant. 
After the accident the minor defendant disaffirmed his contract of 
sale or exchange of his original automobile, apparently for the pur-
pose of reinstating his insurance, the theory being that repudiation 
of that contract made the original sale void. Thus the minor would 
retain coverage under his liability policy while driving another auto-
mobile. 
However, the Court said that avoidance of the sale involving the ex-
change of automobiles would not reinstate the policy, the insurance 
company not having been a party to the sale and the policy having 
terminated, under its provisions, upon sale of the original automobile. 
The rights acquired under the policy were not affected by the insured's 
subsequent acts. A quotation from Badger v. Phinney3 summed up 
the Court's view of the case in a clear fashion: "The 'privilege of in-
fancy is a shield, and not a sword.' " 4 
§17.12. Fire insurance: Insurable interest. It is somewhat rare to 
have questions of insurable interest arise in the present day. The 
question was raised by the insurer, together with a defense of late 
notice of loss, in the Massachusetts federal court in Goodman v. 
Quaker City Fire &- Marine Insurance CO.l 
The owner of a dwelling had two mortgages on his property and his 
fire insurance was payable to the mortgagees. The second mortgagee 
foreclosed and purchased the equity of redemption, leaving the mort-
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1020, 135 N.E.2d at 912. 
§17.ll. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 611, 134 N.E.2d 544. 
2 An unusual procedure permitted intervention in the case, and the opinion of 
the Supreme Judicial Court intimates that such a procedure would not be per-
mitted again. 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 616, 134 N.E.2d at 547. 
3 15 Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. 105 (1819). 
4 15 Mass. at 363, 8 Am. Dec. at 108. 
§17.12. 1141 F. Supp. 61 (D. Mass. 1956). 
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gagor neither legal nor equitable title nor possession. The fire in-
surance policy was renewed at a subsequent date, in its original form, 
and premiums were tendered and retained to the date of the loss. 
The insurer had raised the defense that the policy was void because 
of a lack of an insurable interest in the property by the mortgagor 
after the foreclosure had taken place. Based on the general principle 
that an insurable interest requires the derivation of a benefit to the 
insured from the continued existence of the property or the sustain-
ing of a loss by reason of its destruction, the federal District Court 
held that in its opinion Massachusetts law would find an insurable 
interest. Although the named insured had no title or possession in 
the property, the fact that he could have paid the note on the first 
mortgage and taken an assignment of the mortgage and debt and en-
forced it against the new owner of the equity of redemption gave the 
named insured an insurable interest. The connection appears to be 
rather tenuous and would seem to be the limit to which an insurable 
interest could be stretched. 
However, notice of the loss as required by the terms of the policy 
was not given to the insurance company. It was, therefore, held that 
failure to give proper notice resulted in forfeiture of any claims under 
the policy. 
§17.13. Investments. General Laws, c. 175, §63 is the basic Massa-
chusetts statute governing investments of insurers. A new clause, l4C, 
has been added, allowing investment in bonds and notes of corpora-
tions and business trusts secured by high credit lessee leases or rent 
assignments.1 A mortgage is also required. 
Section 7A of Chapter 175 was also amended to permit domestic 
companies to eliminate the quasi-fund-holding Canadian receipts as 
the source for Canadian mortgage investments.2 The aggregate 
amount of permissible Canadian mortgage investments was reduced 
from 5 to 3 percent of reserve liability. 
§17.14. Mutual companies: Classification of policies. An amend-
ment to G.L., c. 175, §80 permits mutual companies, subject to the 
approval of the Commissioner of Insurance, to establish separate clas-
sifications of policies covering atomic or flood risks. Separate dividend 
percentages may also be applied to these risks.1 
§17.13. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 373. 
2 Id., c. 137. 
§17.14. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 315. 
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